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THE FRENCH CONSEIL DIETAT: A CASE STUDY
IN BOUNDARY MAINTENANCE
Robert Carp* and Harrell Rodgers**

Very little is known about the role that courts play in
the total political system of a nation. In two recent works
Professors Walter Murphy and Joseph Tanenhaus have centered
attention on this question and have isolated some of the major
functions of courts and developed several working hypotheses
concerning these functions. 1 They suggest that one of the
major functions of constitutional courts consists of "defining
the rules of the political game and determining the boundaries
of authority between competing public officials as well as the
boundaries between governmental authority and individual
liberty" 2 In approving or disapproving the acts of governmental bodies, the court performs the additional function of
legitimizero
When it validates official decisions which may at first
blush seem to many to violate the rules, a constitutional
court thereby gives sanction to regime changes which
authorities deem necessary in enabling a system to cope
with stress. In refusing to validate such a decision, a
3
court denies them its imprimatur of legitimacy.
This-article considers the performance of this boundary
maintenance function by the French Conseil d'Etat, an administrative court not authorized by constitution, statute, or
tradition to perform judicial review over acts of the French
administration or the National Assembly. We suggest that the
Conseil d'Etat, normally considered to have very limited powers,
has expanded its own powers to the point where it presently
exercises many of the functions commonly ascribed only to
*Professor of Political Science, University of Iowa.
**Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of
Georgia.
iMurphy & Tanenhaus, Constitutional Courts, Public Opinion,
and Political Representation, Department of Political Science
Report No. 15, University of Iowa (Nov., 1967); and Public
Opinion and the United States Supreme Court: A Preliminary
Mapping of Somae Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of Regime
change, A paper delivered to the 1967 Shambaugh Conference on
Judicial Behavior, University of Iowa.
2 Murphy &
Tanenhaus, Constitutional Courts at 16.
3 Murphy
& Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the United at 2.

constitutional courts. The vehicle for exploring this thesis
is the Canal case. No suggestion is made that the Canal case
is indicative of the typical case handled by the Conseil; but,
the Canal controversy demonstrates vividly the power, prestige,
and expansive role of the Conseil d'Etat in the French political
system.
I.

The Origins of the Conseil d'Etat

Originally created by Napoleon in 1799 as an administrative
organ with purely advisory functions, the Conseil has evolved to
be the apex of the French administrative system. Most students
agree that the political ancestry of the Conseil can be traced
to the Conseil du Roi which existed under the Ancien Regime.4
Like the modern Conseil d'Etat, it was both a technical councilor
to the government and an administrative court.
While today the Conseil d'Etat is still the most powerful
and prestigious adviser to the French government, in more recent
years its judicial functions have overshadowed its administrative
functions. The judicial function of the Conseil resulted from
the French conception of separation of powers which precluded the
regular courts from adjudicating the acts of the administration
or trying governmental officials for any acts connected with their
duties.
This meant that the regular courts had jurisdiction only
over civil suits and criminal cases. To handle cases in which the
state or an administrative official was a party, a separate
structure of administrative courts was established in 1800 with
the Conseil d'Etat at the top. Thereafter a citizen could seek
legal action against the administration by instituting suit with
the Conseil or one of a number of inferior administrative courts
known as Councils of Perfecture.
II.

The Structure of the Conseil d'Etat

1. Division of Labor. The Conseil d'Etat is divided into
five sections, four of which are administrative and one judicial.
The Judicial Section is as large as all the administrative
sections put together, and its membership composes over one-half
of the total members of the Conseil d'Etat (See Appendix I).
Until the reform of 1963 the Judicial Section was divided into
eleven subsections, five of which were independent decision:-making
units with jurisdiction over less important cases. Since, however,
the number of subsections has been reduced to nine and the practice
is for two or more subsections to unite for the conduct of business.
'See, e.5., B. SCMIW4RTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE
COMMON-LAW WORLD 23 (1954).
5 "The Law
August 16-24, 1790, prohibited the ordinary courts
from trying cases in which the public administration or its agents
were involved." C. FREEDEMAN, THE CONSEIL D1 ETAT 10 MODERN FRANCE 4
(1961).

For cases considered particularly important there are two
additional levels of judgment. These cases may be carried, first,
to the full Judicial Section, which is composed of the presiding
officers of the nine subsections, plus two members of the subsections in which the report on the case involved was prepared.
The presiding officer may be either the Vice-President of the
Conseil or the President of the Judicial Section. Cases of the
highest importance are referred, second, to the Plenary Assembly.
This section is composed of the Vice-President (who presides),
the President of the Judicial Section, the presiding officers of
the subsections, and four additional Councilors of State, one
from each of the administrative sections elected each year by
the General Assembly. Only a small proportion of cases ever reach
these two levels. "Of the 4,446 cases dealt with in 1959-1960 . . .
only 178 were handled in the Judicial Section as a whole and only
45 in Plenary Assembly."
2. The Decision-Making Process. The formulation of a report
is the first step in the Conseil's consideration of any matter,
whether it be legislative, administrative, or judicial. The
presiding officer of the section or subsection assigns a member
to submit a report bringing out all the facts which may have a
bearing on the disposition of a particular problem. Normally this
report will be written out. In the administrative sections the
reporter has the prerogative of presenting his solution to the
matter in question. In the Judicial Section a solution is required.
On the day the matter is to be considered, the section or
subsections assemble and the reporter presents his report orally.
The report is followed by discussion, after which the presiding
officer gives a summary. The matter is then submitted to majority
vote. The reporter embodies the decision in a final report which
is submitted to the presiding officer for expedition to the proper
ministry. Some matters, such as bills and regulations of public
administration, must be submitted to a higher echelon of the
Conseil after the initial decision. Normally this is the General
Assembly which consists of all the personnel of the Conseil d'Etat
as well as the Councilors of State in special service and the
ministers. If this is the case the reporter presents his subsequent report to the Assembly, defending the solution of the lower
section or subsections as his own.
The procedure in the Judicial Section varies to some extent.
In addition to the regular reporter there is a Government Commissioner who also formulates and presents a report to the decisionmaking body. The Commissioner, one of the members of the Conseil,
is not considered a representative of the state; his presence is
designed primarily to add weight to the deliberations. Not
bG. CARTER & J. HERZ, MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS 587

(1962).

infrequently his position is rejected. In important cases his
report may be published. Unlike the administrative sections
which keep their decisions private, the Judicial Section meets
in public session to render its decisions.
III.

The Judicial Function of the Conseil d'Etat

The Judicial Section of the Conseil d'Etat serves almost
exclusively as an appellate court, and views its function more
"as the development of an organized system of rules and principles
rather than the decision of cases on their individual merits."
Original jurisdiction in most cases is invested in the twenty-four
Tribunaux Administratifs centered in twenty-three regions and
Paris. 8 Petitions by private individuals come to the Judicial
Section in two basic groups:-those seeking determination that
an administrative act is ultra. vires, and those claiming recours
de pleine jurisdiction.9 A petition for ultra vires may be
brought against any administrative act except acts of state (an
act which deals with the defense of the country, the relations
between the executive and the legislature, diplomatic acts and
treaties), the decisions of judicial authorities, and acts of
management (those which anyone can perform in the administration
of an enterprise or of private property).1 0 At one time the
review of the Conseil was severely restricted by the "acts of
state" principle. In more recent years, however, the Conseil
"is more and more restricting the list of acts considered to
be acts of [state) ."ll
Petitions seeking declaration of exces de pouvoir are made
to the Judicial Section on stamped paper and may either be mailed
or personally delivered. The petitioner explains why he thinks
a certain act that has affected him personally is illegal and why
it should be annulled. The services of a lawyer are not required
but the petitioner may hire one if he wishes. If the petitioner's
claim is upheld by the Conseil no costs are involved; if not, a
small fee is charged.
Originally exces de pouvoir was invoked only for "lack of
jurisdiction," but the Conseil has extended its authority in more
12
recent years to include "improper exercise of jurisdiction."
7 Ro

DAVID & H. P. DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS 128 (1958).
8 The Conseil d'Etat still has original jurisdiction in all
cases involving petitions of exces de pouvoir directed against
the central authorities.
9 Crabb, French
Concept of the Abuse of Rights, INTER-AMERICAN
L. REV. 1 (1964).
16Co FREEDEMAN, THE CONSEIL D'ETAT IN MODERN FRANCE 115 (1961).
1 1 B.

SCHWARTZ, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE COMMON-LAW

WORLD 23 (1954).
1 2 Id. at 202.

76,

The grounds on which the Conseil may annul an act as exces de
(1) lack of
pouvoir can be classified under four headings:
authority; (.2) failure to observe procedures required by law;
(3) abuse of power; and (4) violation of the law. Annulment
for lack of authority results from an agent making a decision
which lies outside the powers of his office. Similarly, an
act can be annulled for failure to observe procedures required
by law if the administrative authority omits required legal
formalities. Abuse of power is caused by an administrative
agent using his power for a purpose other than that for which
it exists. Violation of law originally meant that a constitutional
provision or a statute had been violated in the process of
decision-making. 1 3 Recently violation of the law has been
extended to "include the violation of a general principle of
public law or custom which is not necessarily written, such as
equality before the law of all persons, [or] the equality of
all persons using a public service."'1 4 If the Conseil finds an
act exc~s de pouvoir the act is annulled. If the scope of the
15
act is general, it is annulled for everyone.
Recours de pleine jurisdiction involves actions in which
damages are sought by a party injured by an administrative act.
The petitioner brings action on behalf of himself only and may
claim a restitution or a sum of money. The decision of the
Conseil may reform the original administrative action or require
the administration to pay damages. Here the services of a
lawyer are required. The most important cases under this category
are petitions relating to the responsibility of the public powers,
and petitions relating to administrative contracts. A large
number of cases under this jurisdiction concern taxation, election,
and pensions and salaries of public employees.
Although every regime since 1800 has had a Conseil d'Etat,
its role, prestige and power has vafied according to conditions
in the political environment. De Tocqueville describes a low
point:
I tried to explain to them [the Americans] that the Conseil
d'Etat is not a judicial body in the ordinary sense of the
word, but an administrative body whose members are dependent
on the king so that the king, after having ordered one of
his servants, called a prefect, to commit an injustice, can
of State,
order another of his servants, called a Councilor
16
punished.
being
from
to prevent the former
1 3 Letourneur,

The Rule of Law As Understood in France, 7
AM. J. COMP. L. 107 (1958).
1 4:C. FREEDEMAN,
supra note 10, at 135.
1 5 Letourneur & Hemson,
The Control of Discretionary Executive
Power in France, 11 Cambridge L. J. 258-79 (1952).
1 6 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRATIE EN AMERIQUE, 1 OEUVRES
COMPLETES, pt. 1, at 106 (Meyer ed. 1951).

In more recent years the status of the Conseil has steadily
increased as have its powers. Through such famous cases as
Casanova, 1 7 Chabot, 18 and Richemond 1 9 the Conseil has greatly
expanded the categories under which petitions for exces de
pouvoir can be brought before the Conseil. Through cases such
as Compagnies du Chemin de fer de 1' Est 2 0 and Maurel,2 1 the
Conseil has interpreted and expanded its jurisdiction. In
2 2 Auxerre,23Therond, 2 4
similar fashion through such cases as Cames,
Lemonnier, 2 5 Brunet, 2 6 and Colas, 2 7 the Conseil has developed
extensive legal doctrine recognizing the pecuniary responsibility
of the state for its sovereign acts, and has required the application of the principle of equity to administrative contracts.
One author summed up this aggrandizement by stating that
"the Council of State has been consistently expanding the scope
of reviewing power, until the scope of review in France today
is far broader than in the common-law world."'2 8 The Canal
decision, to which we now turn, is an obvious vehicle for demonstrating just how much power and prestige the Conseil has today.
IV.

The Andre Canal Decision:

Background

In 1962 Algeria became a free and independent nation, and
the bitter struggle between France and the Algerian rebels came
to an end. Although the end of the Algerian war lifted a
substantial burden from the shoulders of the French statesmen,
1 7 Held

that a taxpayer had standing to contest a decision
of the municipal council (1901).
1 8 A voter could attack a decision of a departmental council
which dealt with the apportionment of electoral districts (1903).
1 9 Held that a taxpayer had standing to contest a decision
(1911).
of a department
2 0 Held that
regulations of public administration were not
delegations of legislative power, and could be reviewed as
administrative acts (1907).
2 1 Held that colonial
decrees issued by the President were
not delegations of legislative power, and could be reviewed as
administrative acts (1933).
2 2 Held that state
responsible for injury that an individual
might incur because of the inherent risks of is job (1895).
2 3 Held the state
responsible for its acts overruling the
"irresponsibility doctrine" (1905).
2 4 Extended
review to suits precipitated by administrative
contracts for the communes and departments (1910).
2 5 Held the state
responsible for double fault which resulted
from negligence on the part of the state employee and the state (1918).
2 6 Held that the
state was responsible for failure to act with
due speed (1919).
37Extended the responsibility of the state to third parties (1920).
28 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 11, at 321.

it left in its wake considerable problems for the French administrators of justice. For throughout the Algerian war there had
been numerous attempts by private citizens and by army chieftains
to obstruct or to force alterations in the Government's Algerian
policy. Most of these attempts had been not only illegal actions
but also violent acts of treason. Thus, the cases were of a
nature not often handled by the regular courts of justice. There
was a sizable number of such cases in the spring of 1962, and the
government was concerned that they be handled speedily and with a
minimum of procedural due process.
On June 1, 1962, the Gaullist National Assembly passed a law
instituting a special military court of justice to handle these
above mentioned "special" cases. This new military court was
granted the authority to impose the death sentence, and no appeal
was permitted beyond its final judgment. The authority to
institute such a court was supposedly conferred upon the Government
in a special referendum approved by the French people on April 8,
1962. The referendum was designed to provide the Gaullist
government with a broad mandate of power to deal with emergency
situations arising out of the Algerian war.
During the summer of 1962 Mr. Andre Canal was brought before
this military court, tried for his crimes against the French people,
and duly sentenced to death. Since Canal could not legallyappeal
his sentence to a higher court, his only recourse was to appeal to
the Conseil d'Etat on the grounds that the military court was an
illegal institution, that is, the act setting up the military court
was exces de pouvoir.
In light of the authority possessed by the Conseil d'Etat in
declaring governmental acts exces de pouvoir, the audacity of
Mr. Canal's appeal is astounding. First, only administrative acts
may be declared exces d29
de pouvoir:
The law setting up the military
court appeared to be a legislative act -- not an administrative
action. Second, a petition pour exces de pouvoir may be brought
against only those administrative acts which are not "acts of
state."'3 0 Admittedly, the Conseil had established the precedent
of deciding for itself the boundaries of "acts of state," but,
within the context of French jurisprudence, this case appeared
unquestionably to fall into that category. Thus, even if the law
setting up the military court of justice were an administrative
act, the Conseil still would not have jurisdiction. Normally, only
by a constitutional review could a question of this nature be
adjudicated. At best, Canal's appeal to the Conseil d'Etat seemed
to rest on very questionable legal grounds.
Nevertheless, the Conseil d'Etat agreed to consider his appeal,
and on the 19th of October 1962 the Plenary Judicial Assembly
handed down its landmark decision. The Assembly held, first of all,
that
2 9 C.
30

id.

FREEDEMAN, supra note 10, at 115.

the ordinance of June 1, 1962, instituting a military court
of justice, conserved the character of an administrative
act and was thus susceptible to a declaration of exces de
31
pouvoir.
Refusing to regard this "administrative act" as an act of state,
the Assembly went on to declare that the ordinance of June 1
had "violated the general principles of penal law"'3 2 and was null
and void. With one quick stroke the Conseil d'Etat had set aside
an act of the French National Assembly, an act which had been
based on a grant of power derived from a referendum of the French
people, and an act which was closely tied to the prestige and
authority of the President of the Republic. Obviously the Conseil
was exercising its boundary-defining prerogative to the utmost
degree.
V.

Reactions to the Canal Decision

1. The Government's Reaction. The Conseil's decision came
as a severe blow to the Gaullist government, which immediately
expressed its great displeasure. The Government's main contention
was that the Conseil d'Etat had exceeded its legitimate authority.
This contention was expressed in the following statement issued
by the Council of Ministers on October 24th:
The President of the Republic and the Government have
determined that the intervention of the Conseil d'Etat
seeking to render inoperative an ordinance taken on an
essential point, in the spirit and in application of a
law voted by the country on last April 8th, went beyond
the Conseil's legal administrative domain; and in addition,
the conditions and the moment of this intervention was of
such a nature as to compromise the action of the public
powers with regard to the criminal subversion which has
33
not yet been reduced.
The statement went on to note that
the next Council of Ministers will have to take cognizance
of the means which ought to be taken, conforming to the
Constitution, in spite of all incidents, notably that
justice continue to be assured in the present and in the
34
future.
3 lLe Monde, October
3 2 Drago, Autour

26, 1962, at 6.
de la r~forme du Conseil d'Etat, 19 ACTUALITE
JURIDIQUE 525 (October 2, 1962).
3 3 Le Monde,
October 26, 1962,at 6.
341aO2
2

The Government's spokesman, Mr. Christian Fouchet, Minister
of Informatio, voiced another expression of official anger.
Fouchet also-cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Conseil's
decision.
The Government takes note of the existence of the judgment
of the Conseil d'Etat but considers that this judgment has
no validity. The Conseil d'Etat went outside its domain
in trying to make this into a judicial matter

....

President De Gaulle was particularly irked because he felt
that the Conseil had not acted in accordance with its proper
role; that role was to "serve the state" and not to take
independent positions vis-a-vis the State. 3 6 According to
De Gaulle, the Conseil d'Etat was not a separate branch of
government, but rather an institution designed to carry out the
wishes, or at least not to obstruct the will, of the Government.
2. Reactions to the Government's Irate Position. Never
before in the memory of most Frenchmen had the Government been
so outspokenly incensed at a decision handed down by the
Conseil d'Etat. Many persons could remember the irritation
expressed by an administrator or by an under-secretary when
the Conseil had declared one of his actions exces de pouvoir;
but no one could recall a situation where the Conseil had been
roundly criticized by so many important governmental spokesmen -from the Chief of State on down. But then, most Frenchmen could
not recall when the Conseil had set itself in opposition to such
an array of authority.
The influential newspaper Le Monde took note of this popular
reaction to the Government's indignation in an article on
October 31st:
These declarations and the menace which they seem to
portend for the Conseil d'Etat have solicited numerous
commentaries, indeed lively emotion, in all the milieux
which know what they represent in France and abroad for
the high administrative jurisdiction. 3 7
Professor Roland Drago of the Faculty of Law and Economic
Sciences of the University of Lille noted that there was a fear
among many persons that "radical measures would be taken against
the High Assembly

. . .

given the vigor of the governmental

reactions. ,,38
35
1d.
3 6L6e Monde,

January 4, 1963, at 1.
Monde, October 31, 1962, at 1.
38Irago, supra note 32, at 525.
3 7 Le

VI.

The Institution of the Governmental Study Group

The Government's first official action aimed at the Conseil
d'Etat was the institution of a special study group which was to
"propose modifications to the organization and functioning of
the Conseil d'Etat."'3 9 This study group was installed 4on
0
January 4, 1963, by the Minister of Justice, Mr. Foyer.
Normally the proceedings of such a study group are
secret; only top government leaders are privy to its findings.
Nevertheless, its conclusions were somehow leaked to the press. 4 1
In addition to several minor technical modifications, the study
group proposed certain radical reforms regarding the legal jurisdiction of the Conseil d'Etat, its consultative function and the
status of its members. According to Le Monde, the proposed reforms
were as follows:

(1) A Superior Judicial Commission was instituted, composed
of the vice-president and five section presidents, to
which the Government could decide to submit all disputed
matters by a decision made by the Council of Ministers.
(2) Beside the General Assembly provided for by the
ordinance of July 31, 1945, there would be constituted
a Restricted Assembly designed to proceed to a more
rapid and efficient examination of the texts submitted
by the Government.
(3) Finally, the councilors of state who normally reach the
retirement age of 70 years (article 18 of the ordinance
of July 31, 1945) ought to, at sixty and at sixty-five
years old, solicit from the Government the renewal of
their positions, the decision of the Government concommission
forming to the opinion of the consultative
42
group.
study
the
by
proposed
was
which
3 9 Le

Monde, January 4, 1963, at 1.
4UBy all outward appearances it was a blue-ribbon panel.
The chairmanship of this group was given to Mr. Leon Noel,
President of the Constitutional Council and former member of
the Conseil d'Etat. The group comprised three former ministers,
M. M. Guillaumat, Jeanneney and Chenot, himself a member of the
Conseil d'Etat. The other members were M. Jean Rivero, professor
at the Paris Faculty of Law and Economic Sciences, Mr. Toutee,
section-president, M. Odent, council of state and assistantpresident of the Judicial Section, and, finally, four maltres
des requetes: M. M. Lasry, Belin, Grevisse and Boitreaud.
supra note 32, at 525.
See Drago,
4 1 Le
Monde, May 18, 1963.
4Id. at 525-526.

VII.

Reaction of the Attentive Public to the Proposed Reforms

1. A Partial Description of the Conseil d'Etat's Attentive
Public. An examination of the diffuse and specific support
given the Conseil d'Etat by its attentive public first requires
a determination of who and what this attentive public was. Some
insight into this matter is provided by Professor Groshens of
the Faculty of Law and Economic and Political Sciences at the
University of Strasbourg:
The first question that one can ask himself is whether the
Conseil d'Etat is known by the citizens as the protector
of their liberty. An inquiry into this topic would be
quite welcome; perhaps it would reveal what certain opinion
samples have hinted at: the Conseil d'Etat is known by only
a very restricted number of citizens, the political class,
the legal profession, and certain categories of civil
servants. Outside these circles, to a very limited degree,
the Conseil d'Etat is unknown or in any case is not considered as being the organ before which everyone may
43
defend his rights and his liberty.
Thus the scant evidence we have would tend to indicate that
the Conseil d'Etat's attentive public is select and by no means
representative of a cross-section of the French population.
Despite the small size of this public, however, its influence
and political weight are considerable. Few governments would
risk pursuing any policy which might incur the organized and
vocal opposition of this community of political influentials.
Its reactions to the proposed Conseil d'Etat reforms demonstrate
the impact of this intellectual community.
2. The Attentive Public Reacts in Support of the Conseil
d'Etat. The first rumble of opposition to the proposed reforms
came from the highly respected and influential newspaper
Le Monde, a paper read by nearly all students, civil servants,
lawyers, and intellectuals in France. In a front page article
entitled "The Report of the Study Group Risks Modifying the Role
of the Conseil d'Etat," the editor noted that:
The intention of the reformers appears clearly in the
exposition of motives. If it is true that the mission
of the Conseil d'Etat is to safeguard the necessary
equilibrium between the protection of liberties and the
authority of the State, it in effect reproaches the
Conseil for having throughout the years attached itself
more to the defense of liberties than to the State.
4 3 Groshens,

R'flections sur la dualite de jurdiction,
19 ACTUALITE JURIDIQUE 538 (October, 1963).

In substituting a hierarchial structure for a liberal
organization, in entrusting to five or six persons the
upper hand-over the Conseil, and even over the career of
its older members, the report risks creating a means of
pressure, an instrument which a power less respectful of
liberties could use and even abuse.
In this regard the proposed reform poses a problem more
44
political than judicial.
Thus Le Monde saw the reform as nthing more than an attempt
by the Government to impose its political will on members of the
Conseil d'Etat who would take an independent stand in the interest
of civil liberties.
During May and June of.1963 a bitter but articulate debate
raged throughout the French intellectual community concerning
reform of the Conseil d'Etat. This debate was carried on in part
through a series of articles by prominent jurists, political
scientists, and governmental officials in Le Monde.
One of the most vocal critics of the proposed reforms was
Mr. Pierre Marcilhacy, a French legislator and authority on civil
and administrative law. His somewhat impassioned defense of the
integrity of the Conseil d'Etat began with a historical summary
of attempts to reform the Conseil and ended with these remarks:
It is necessary to recall here that the public services
have slowly but surely seen, through carefully considered
judgments, a definition of their powers and their roles,
that the liberty of the citizens and of the collectivities
have been defended by several resounding decisions, finally,
that aside from the grave crises of the separation of
Church and State and the Liberation, it is the High
Administrative Assembly which has noiselessly but efficiently
contributed to re-establish public order .

...

Shall we also say that perhaps the best of our statesmen
and important civil servants have come from this elite
corps? Those who are in power, would they be what they
are if they had not been nourished on the very principles
for which their institution is now being reproached for
having defended to the end?
The signer of these lines is familiar with the disciplines
of civil and administrative law. As his peers, he knows
the perils of the double nature of judicial responsibility.
As a legislator, as a former elector, he has the right,
4 4 Le

Monde, May 18, 1963, at 1.

after having spoken his acknowledgment and his admiration
for the High Administrative Assembly, to ask the Government
not to lead us back to the notions of the Ancien Regime
which are not compatible with man's progress. 4 5
Shortly after Mr. Marcilhacy's article, a second and more
devastating critique appeared in Le Monde. Its author was
Professor Maurice Duverger, perhaps Francets most eminent political
scientist. Duverger questioned not only the specific provisions
in the proposed reforms, but also the manner in which the reform
was being carried out and the dire consequences which would result
from it. There is no doubt that Duverger saw the Cbnseil d'Etat
as an important factor in the total political process and not
simply as a judicial agency isolated from the political world.
For this reason Duverger's perceptive remarks have a special
interest for American students of political behavior:
In the eyes of the public, in any case, this creation of
an exceptional jui isdiction at the interior of a common
law jurisdiction would have a very simple meaning. The
public would think that the Government is throwing out
the rightful judges in order to choose some others because
the latter are more favorable to the Government's position
and more susceptible to its pressure. Even if that is
false, everyone will think that it is true. Confidence in
the judges will be diminished in the eyes of those who
come before the courts, and without such confidence there
can be no justice. As Caesar's wife put it, the magistrates ought to be above suspicion. The proposed reform
encloses them in an atmosphere of permanent suspicion.
At the same time it would also place them in an impossible
situation. Imagine the practical development of the
following hypothetical situation. A decision of the
Council of Ministers results in a matter which is brought
before the Superior Judicial Commission. Immediately, the
press, the Parliament, the public would all be aware of it
at the same moment. The court proceeding is transformed
into a political affair, into a spectacular conflict
between the executive and the judiciary, into a struggle
for power against the judges. If the Commission were to
say the State is right, everyone would think that the
members gave way to pressure, that they lacked courage
and impartiality, that they didn't do their duty. If the
Commission says it was wrong, then it is the Government
which loses face, which is reprimanded by the stalwart
judges.46
4 5 Le
4 6Le

Monde, May 24, 1963, at 6.
Monde, June 6, 1963, at 6.

Then Duverger gets to the heart of his critique: the reform
proposals are bad enough in themselves, but the ciicumstances
under which the reform was inaugurated leave the reformers' good
intentions open to grave doubt. He argues that:
the Government wants to reform the Conseil d'Etat because
it was displeased with one of the Conseil's decisions.
Under such circumstances any Conseil reform, as good as
it might be from a technical standpoint, will appear as
an attack on its independence and will risk the destruction
of confidence for those who appear before the court, without
which the institution no longer has a reason for being.
Certainly the study commission has undertaken courageous
efforts to limit the damage. It has striven to lessen the
consequences of the anger of the prince [De Gaulle].
But
the fundamental error is having suggested that the
administrative jurisdiction ought to be adjusted, even
ever so slightly. There can be a Conseil d'Etat only when
each successive holder of political power is willing to
submit himself to it, just as the citizens do to the rules
under its jurisdiction. To allow one of them to change
these rules following a judgment which angered him is to
transform the Conseil d'Etat into a Conseil du Roi [the
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Conseil d'Etat's antecedent under the Ancien Regime].
Though nearly all spokesmen on the topic of reform were
critical of the Government, there were a few who defended the
report of the study commission. One such defense appeared in
the May 21 issue of Le Monde by an author who -- interestingly
enough -- wished to remain anonymous. He said nothing about the
circumstances surrounding the initiation of the reform, but
rather limited himself to defending the specific proposals on
their own merits. He contended (1) that certain reforms in the
Conseil were long overdue, (2) that the proposed reforms would
be beneficial to the Conseil, and (3) that the dire consequences
for the Conseil predicted by some persons were greatly exaggerated. 4 8
Despite these arguments, the views of this anonymous author
appear to have been held by only a small minority of the Conseil
d'Etat's attentive public. It was clear that the Government's
proposed reforms had aroused the united and vocal opposition of
the French community of political influentials.
VIII.

The Government's Withdrawal

The effect of this support for the Conseil became apparent
when the Council of Ministers met on July 3, 1963. The Government
47
Id.
4 8 Le Monde,

May 21, 1963, at 11.

decided to abandon both of the following controversial proposals:
the institution of a Superior Judicial Commission and the modification of the age limits of the councilors of state. It appeared
that these indignant cries from the Conseil's attentive public
had forced the Government to back down. Professor Drago noted in
a journal article a month later that "perhaps the very vigor of
these reactions must have prompted the Government not to adopt
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the more revolutionary aspects of the study group propositions."1
The reforms which were decreed by the Government on July 30th,
were moderate in nature -- a far cry from the initial proposals of
the study commission. These reforms, most of which came to be
praised by the Conseil's attentive public, were discussed in
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summary fashion in a July fifth edition of Le Monde.
The first of these texts concerns the organization and
functioning of the Conseil d'Etat. It applies itself to three
principles.
UNITY OF THE COUNCIL'- The two functions of administrative
judge and of governmental councilor exercised by the members
of the Conseil are henceforth made more unified. The decree
sets forth the rule of dual participation by the members of
the Conseil in the administrative and the judicial formations.
The research goal is that the legal section be more familiar
with the problems of the administration and that the
administrative councilors of the government be forewarned in
case of future annulments.
REDUCTION OF THE FORMATIONS - Along side the General Plenary
Assembly a Restricted General Assembly of twenty-nine members
was created. The other formations were likewise reduced. It
is thus so with the Judicial Assembly, with the Judicial
Section and with the judicial subsections.
CLOSER COLLABORATION WITH THE ACTIVE ADMINISTRATION, notably
in the form of missions close to the Ministers.
The second decree concerns the status of the members of the
Conseil d'Etat. A consultative commission will give its opinion
on measures relating to the administration of personnel. Different
4 9 Drago, supra
5 0 There were

note 32, at 526.
numerous appeals for reform of the Conseil d'Etat
prior to the Canal decision. See Drago at 525. Many of these
proposals were subsequently adopted in the study group's "revised"
report. This fact is important because it allowed the government
to proceed with the reform movement -- and thereby save face --

even though the heart of its original reform proposals had been
cut out. Had the Government not had this face-saving opportunity,
it is perhaps doubtful whether the Government would have backed
down so readily.

cases are envisioned, notably in that concerning councilors
who have become legislators. The status of councilors in
extraordinary service was modified: they could be named for
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a non-renewable term of four years.
IX.

Response to the New Reform Decrees

1. The Response of the Attentive Public. In general,
response by the Conseil's attentive public to the "revised"
reforms was neutral to somewhat favorable. According to
Professor Pierre Sandevoir, Course Chairman at the Faculty of
Law and Economic Sciences at the University of Lille, the heart
of the reform deals with the desire to create a closer working
relationship between the Conseil d'Etat's legal section and its
administrative sections.
In an article in the Revue Administrative,
he notes that a number of "mixed" commissions were created for this
purpose, and that members oE each section were placed on commissions
in the other sections, that is, members of the administrative
sections now have a voice in what is done in the judicial section
and vice versa.52 Sandevoir contends that these changes are not
at all revolutionary but rather they are in line with the historical
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purpose and functions of the Conseil d'Etat.
In Professor Drago's concluding paragraph on the reform, he,
too, sounds a note of cautious optimism about the nature and
probable effect of the reform decrees.
It is difficult to give a snap judgment about the reform
set in motion by the decrees of July 30th. The most talked
about parts of the project having been put aside, the reform
has happily not been of the revolutionary character which
it otherwise would have been. Certain modifications which
it anticipates will undoubtedly remain debatable, others are
of a more happy nature. The main thing is that the High
Assembly will not be disfigured and may continue its work.5 4
2. The Government's Justification of the Reform. In explaining
and justifying the reform decrees, the Government took great care
to assure the public that the purpose of the reform was not to
change the Conseil d'Etat, but rather to enable the Conseil to
better discharge its historical and traditional functions. The
notion that one must "reform to conserve" was the heart of the
Government's line.
5 1 Le Monde, July
5 2 Sandevoir,

5, 1963, at 9.
Le Conseil d'Etat et la r4 forme de 1963, REVUE
ADMINISTRATIVE 574-583 (1963).
5 3 Id.
at 578.
54D-rago, supra note 32, at 536.

In commenting on the reform decrees, Mr. Peyrefitte, the
new Minister of Information, assured the public that the
Government was attempting
not to create a rupture in the tradition of the Conseil
d'Etat, but on the contrary to restore that tradition.
The Conseil d'Etat is at the same time a governmental
council and an administrative tribunal, and, in order to
be in a position to fully exercise its role, ought not
to be isolated from the Administration, but on the contrary
associated as much as possible with the life of the
Administration, in such a way as to know its needs and its
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difficulties.
Speaking before the General Assembly of the Conseil d'Etat,
Mr. Jean Foyer, Minister of Justice, also spoke in rather
conciliatory tones of diffuse support as he explained the
Government's position:
If the Conseil d'Etat has rendered some regrettable
decisions, it is none the less a precious institution
capable of rendering some great services. It is for this
reason that it has been made a corps of free and independent
men, having their freedom of speech, but also a corp which
does not set itself up as5 6 a judge of the Administration and
as its inner conscience.
X.

Concluding Observations

The Conseil d'Etat is indeed an institution of considerable
power and prestige in the French political process, perhaps much
more so than most foreign observers have heretofore imagined. It
is not a mere appendage of the French administrative leviathan:
rather, it is a powerful and independent institution having
considerable influence vis-a-vis the several legislative,
executive, and administrative organs in France.
Certainly this power and independence was well illustrated
by the case study of l'affaire Canal. The failure of the
Government to put through its radical reforms of the Conseil,
the more and more delicate and deferential manner in which the
Government was forced to move against the Conseil, and the
substantial support given the Conseil by the French intellectual
community all demonstrate the stature and esteem of the Conseil
d'Etat in French political life.
5 5 Le
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Furthermore, the Canal crisis bears striking similarity
to the Roosevelt court packing incident of 1937. First, both
crises began when the will of the executive was thwarted by a
judicial decision, or series of judicial decisions. In both
cases the judicial body's offending decision(s) dealt with a
boundary question, and in both instances the decisions were
based on logic which was open to question. A second similarity
is that in both situations the executive took action only when
he felt it had sufficient support among the populace and among
the legislators to assure his success. Third, in both instances
strong opposition came from the community of political influentials
which saw the proposed reform as an attempt by the executive to
undermine the prestige and authority of the offending judicial
body. Finally, in both situations the executive was forced to
back down although not to the point of completely losing face.
(The Supreme Court did an about-face at the last moment, and the
French government did put forth a weak reform measure.)
Perhaps the Canal decision may well have laid the groundwork
for other, more important decisions in the future -- decisions
which might further expand the already prestigious role of the
Conseil d'Etat in the French political process. The fact that
such decisions have not been forthcoming during the past several
recall that
years should not belie this assumption. One should
57whcsefot
which set forth
the momentous decision of Marbury v. Madison,
the American doctrine of judicial review, was not followed up
until the Dred Scott 5 8 decision fifty-four years later. Nevertheless, the groundwork for Dred Scott had been laid years before:
there could well be a similarity between the Canal and the Marbury
decisions.
One may suggest a more specific conclusion: that the Conseil
d'Etat appears to perform the function of rule definition and
boundary maintenance in the French political system. Admittedly,
this conclusion is weak and will remain so at least until two
inquiries are subsequently undertaken: First, there must be a
more precise investigation, using modern techniques of opinion
sampling, which seeks to answer the following questions: how
visible is the Conseil d'Etat to the French public? who is the
Conseil's truly attentive public? and what kind of, and how much,
support do these publics give the Conseil d'Etat? Secondly, there
must be a systematic investigation which puts the Canal decision
into the over-all perspective of a Conseil d'Etat which has
gradually been expanding its jurisdiction since the founding of
the Third Republic. Only then can one determine how revolutionary
the Canal decision was in terms of rule definition and boundary
maintenance.
571 Cranch 137 (1803).
5 8 Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857).

An equally important point is that the Conseil has long
been considered a very effective institution for providing the
French citizen with protection against illegal administrative
acts. But this has always been considered a very circumscribed
role, limited to pedestrian matters, and not the great political
issues of the day. In truth the Conseil may be capable of
performing the much greater role of constitutional court, much
like the United States Supreme Court. This hypothesis also
warrants further investigation.

APPENDIX I
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